The Prime Minister of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America consulted each other in the common interest of the peoples of their countries and of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to support, during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe, the policies of their three governments by supporting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former satellite states of the Axis Powers of Europe in the intermediate democratic solution of their urgent political and economic problems. 24 Before Stalin entered the war, he had to obtain Chiang Kai-shek`s approval of Kanta`s provisions. The provisions of the secret Woalta agreement flagrantly violated the sovereign rights of the Chinese government. Although Chiang Kai-shek was informed of the secret Jaalta agreement a few weeks after the conference, it was not until June 15.29 that he was officially informed of its specific provisions concerning Chinese territory, Stalin and Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong began negotiations on July 2. Soong insisted on China`s rights regarding Outer Mongolia and railways and ports in Manchuria. While China insisted that it could not make concessions on these questions of sovereignty, for Stalin these were the indispensable acquisitions on which future Soviet security would depend. The unsuccessful negotiations were interrupted when Stalin and Molotov left Moscow at Nach Potsdam and Soong returned to Chongqing to obtain further instructions.30 12A to receive these war trophies, Stalin had to fulfill two important conditions: participation in the war and agreement with the Chinese government on Kanta`s terms. Otherwise, the Allies could break their promises at the peace conference. Therefore, it was imperative for him not only to enter the war, but also to prevent the end of the war before the Soviets joined it. Third, Stalin`s diplomatic success was based on the continuation of his earlier tactical maneuvers. Relying on America`s need to ensure Soviet participation in the war against Japan, he presented his true goals as if they were concessions to the United States.

17Stalin raised the possibility of discussing “the area of operation for the armies and occupation zones of Japan.” Hopkins connected with Truman: “The marshal expected Russia to participate in the actual occupation of Japan and want an agreement with the British and us on the occupation zones.” 19 Hopkins` acceptance of this proposal may have whetted Stalin`s appetite, which may have led to his request during the Soviet Hokkaido-Kuril operations to demand both a Soviet occupation zone on the northern half of Hokkaido and a Soviet occupation area in Tokyo.20 The most important point of the Stalinist Hopkins Conference was Hopkins` offer to put concrete proposals for Japan`s surrender on the agenda of the next lecture by Stalin Hopkins. 21 This would justify Stalin`s entry into the war against Japan in violation of the Neutrality Pact. 36 FRUS: Potsdam, Bd. 2, 1587-1588. See Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 142; Hasegawa, “Soviet Factor in Ending the Pacific War,” 213. On July 21, the combined U.S.-British leaders met with their Soviet counterparts for the first time. Leahy asked General Antonov to give an overview of the Soviet plan of action against Japan. Antonov replied that the Soviets “would be ready to start operating in the last half of August.” The actual date would depend on the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese. .